Dear Sir, In this letter I shall further examine two clauses in the proposed constitution respecting appointments to office.—By art. 2. sect. 2. the president shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments, &c. By art. 1, sect. 6. No senator or representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time.

Thus the president must nominate, and the senate concur in the appointment of all federal officers, civil and military, and the senators and representatives are made ineligible only to the few civil offices abovementioned. To preserve the federal government pure and un-corrupt, peculiar precautions relative to appointments to office will be found highly necessary from the very forms and character of the government itself. The honours and emoluments of public offices are the objects in all communities, that ambitious and necessitous men never lose sight of. The honest, the modest, and the industrious part of the community content themselves, generally, with their private concerns; they do not solicit those offices which are the perpetual source of cabals, intrigues, and contests among men of the former description, men embarrassed, intriguing, and destitute of modesty. Even in the most happy country and virtuous government, corrupt influence in appointments cannot always be avoided; perhaps we may boast of our share of virtue as a people, and if we are only sufficiently aware of the influence, biasses, and prejudices, common to the affairs of men, we may go far towards guarding against the effects of them.

We all agree, that a large standing army has a strong tendency to depress and enslave the people; it is equally true that a large body of selfish, unfeeling, unprincipled civil officers has a like, or a more pernicious tendency to the same point. Military, and especially civil establishments, are the necessary appendages of society; they are deductions from productive labour, and substantial wealth, in proportion to the number of men employed in them; they are oppressive where unnecessarily extended and supported by men unfriendly to the people; they are injurious when too small, and supported by men too timid and dependant. It is of the last importance to decide well upon the necessary number of offices, to fill them with proper characters, and to establish efficiently the means of punctually punishing those officers who may do wrong.

To discern the nature and extent of this power of appointments, we need only to consider the vast number of officers necessary to execute a national system in this extensive country, the prodigious biasses the hopes and expectations of offices have on their conduct, and the influence public officers have among the people—these necessary officers, as judges, state’s attorneys, clerks, sheriffs, &c. in the federal supreme and inferior courts, admirals and generals, and subordinate officers in the army.
and navy, ministers, consuls, &c. sent to foreign countries; officers in the federal city, in
the revenue, post office departments, &c. &c. must, probably, amount to several
thousands, without taking into view the very inferior ones. There can be no doubt but
that the most active men in politics, in and out of congress, will be the foremost
candidates for the best of these offices; the man or men who shall have the disposal of
them, beyond dispute, will have by far the greatest share of active influence in the
government; but appointments must be made, and who shall make them? what modes
of appointments will be attended with the fewest inconveniences? is the question. The
senators and representatives are the law makers, create all offices, and whenever they
see fit, they impeach and try officers for misconduct; they ought to be in session but
part of the year, and as legislators, they must be too numerous to make appointments,
perhaps, a few very important ones excepted. In contemplating the necessary officers of
the union, there appear to be six different modes in which, in whole or in part, the
appointments may be made, 1. By the legislature; 2. by the president and senate—3. by
the president and an executive council—4. by the president alone—5. by the heads of
the departments—and 6. by the state governments—Among all these, in my opinion,
there may be an advantageous distribution of the power of appointments. In
considering the legislators, in relation to the subject before us, two interesting
questions particularly arise—1. Whether they ought to be eligible to any offices
whatever during the period for which they shall be elected to serve, and even for some
time afterwards—and 2. How far they ought to participate in the power of
appointments. As to the first, it is true that legislators in foreign countries, or in our
state governments, are not generally made ineligible to office: there are good reasons
for it; in many countries the people have gone on without ever examining the principles
of government. There have been but few countries in which the legislators have been a
particular set of men periodically chosen: but the principal reason is, that which
operates in the several states, viz. the legislators are so frequently chosen, and so
numerous, compared with the number of offices for which they can reasonably consider
themselves as candidates, that the chance of any individual member’s being chosen, is
too small to raise his hopes or expectations, or to have any considerable influence upon
his conduct. Among the state legislators, one man in twenty may be appointed in some
committee business, &c. for a month or two; but on a fair computation, not one man in
a hundred sent to the state legislatures is appointed to any permanent office of profit:
directly the reverse of this will evidently be found true in the federal administration.
Throughout the United States, about four federal senators, and thirty-three
representatives, averaging the elections, will be chosen in a year; these few men may
rationally consider themselves as the fairest candidates for a very great number of
lucrative offices, which must become vacant in the year, and pretty clearly a majority of
the federal legislators, if not excluded, will be mere expectants for public offices. I need
not adduce further arguments to establish a position so clear; I need only call to your
recolletion my observations in a former letter, wherein I endeavoured to shew the
fallacy of the argument, that the members must return home and mix with the people.
It is said, that men are governed by interested motives, and will not attend as
legislators, unless they can, in common with others, be eligible to offices of honor and
profit. This will undoubtedly be the case with some men, but I presume only with such men as never ought to be chosen legislators in a free country; an opposite principle will influence good men; virtuous patriots, and generous minds, will esteem it a higher honor to be selected as the guardians of a free people; they will be satisfied with a reasonable compensation for their time and service; nor will they wish to be within the vortex of influence. The valuable effects of this principle of making legislators ineligible to offices for a given time, has never yet been sufficiently attended to or considered: I am assured, that it was established by the convention after long debate, and afterwards, on an unfortunate change of a few members, altered. Could the federal legislators be excluded in the manner proposed, I think it would be an important point gained; as to themselves, they would be left to act much more from motives consistent with the public good.