It was further said, that in a federal government over States equally free, sovereign and independent, *every State* ought to have an equal share in *making* the federal laws or regulations—m *deciding* upon them, and in *carrying them into execution*, neither of which was the case in this system, but the reverse, the States not having an *equal voice* in the *legislature*, nor in the *appointment* of the *executive*, the *judges*, and the *other officers of government*—It was insisted, that in the *whole* system there was but *one federal* feature—the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that *this feature* was only *federal* in *appearance*.

To prove *this*, and that the Senate *as constituted* could not be a *security* for the *protection* and *preservation* of the *State governments*, and that the *senators* could not be justly considered the *representatives* of the *States as States*, it was observed, that upon *just principles* of *representation*, the *representative* ought to *speak* the sentiments of his *constituents*, and ought to *vote* in the *same manner* that his *constituents* would do (as far as he can judge) provided his constituents were acting in *person*, and had the same knowledge and information with himself; and therefore that the *representative* ought to be *dependant* on his *constituents*, and *answerable* to them—that the connection between the *representative* and the *represented*, ought to be as *near* and as *close* as possible; according to these principles, Mr. Speaker, in this State it is provided by *its constitution*, that the representatives in Congress, shall be chosen *annually*, shall be *paid* by the *State*, and shall be subject to *recall* even within the year; so *cautiously* has our *constitution* guarded against an *abuse* of the trust reposed in our representatives in the federal government; whereas by the *third* and *sixth* sections of the *first* article of this new system, the senators are to be chosen for *six* years instead of being chosen *annually*; instead of being paid by *their States* who send them, *they* in conjunction with the other branch, are to *pay themselves* out of the treasury of the United States; and are not liable to be *recalled* during the period for which they are chosen—Thus, Sir, for *six years* the *senators* are rendered totally and absolutely *independent* of *their States*, of *whom* they ought to be the *representatives*, without *any bond or tie* between them—*During that time* they may join in measures *ruinous* and *destructive* to *their States*, even such as should *totally annihilate* their *State governments*, and their States *cannot recall* them, *nor exercise any controul over them*. Another consideration, Mr. Speaker, it was thought ought to have *great weight* to prove that the *smaller* States cannot *depend* on the *senate* for the *preservation* of *their rights*, either against *large* and *ambitious States*, or against an *ambitious, aspiring President*.—The senate, Sir, is so constituted, that they are not only to compose one branch of the legislature, but by the second section of the second article, they are to *compose a privy council for the President*; hence it will he necessary, that they should be, in a great measure, a *permanent* body, *constantly residing* at the seat of government. *Seventy years* is estimated for the life of a man; it can hardly be supposed, that a senator, especially from the States remote from the seat of empire, will accept of an appointment which must *estrang[e] him* for *six years from his State*,
without giving up to a great degree his prospects in his own State. If he has a family, he will take his family with him to the place where the government shall be fixed, that will become his home, and there is every reason to expect that his future views and prospects will centre in the favours and emoluments either of the general government, or of the government of that State where the seat of empire is established:–In either case, he is lost to his own State. If he places his future prospects in the favours and emoluments of the general government, he will become the dependant and creature of the President, as the system enables a senator to be appointed to offices, and without the nomination of the President, no appointment can take place; as such, he will favour the wishes of the President, and concur in his measures, who, if he has no ambitious views of his own to gratify, may be too favourable to the ambitious views of the large States, who will have an undue share in his original appointment, and on whom he will be more dependant afterwards than on the States which are smaller. If the senator places his future prospects in that State where the seat of empire is fixed; from that time he will be in every question wherein its particular interest may be concerned the representative of that State, not of his own.