Luther Martin: Genuine Information IV, Baltimore *Maryland Gazette*, 8 January 1788

It was further said, that in a *federal* government over States *equally* free, sovereign and independent, *every State* ought to have an equal share in *making* the federal laws or *regulations*—*deciding* upon them, and in *carrying* them into execution, neither of which was the case in this system, but the reverse, the States not having an *equal voice* in the *legislature*, nor in the *appointment* of the executive, the *judges*, and the other *officers of government*—It was insisted, that in the whole system there was but one *federal* feature—the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only *federal in appearance*.

To prove this, and that the Senate as constituted could not be a *security* for the *protection* and *preservation* of the State *governments*, and that the *senators* could not be justly considered the *representatives* of the States as States, it was observed, that upon *just principles of representation*, the representative ought to *speak* the sentiments of his *constituents*, and ought to *vote* in the *same manner* that his *constituents* would do (as far as he can judge) provided his constituents were acting in *person*, and had the same knowledge and information with himself; and therefore that the *representative* ought to be *dependant* on his *constituents*, and *answerable* to them—that the connection between the *representative* and the *represented*, ought to be as *near* and as *close as possible*; according to these principles, Mr. Speaker, in this State it is provided by *its constitution*, that the representatives in Congress, shall be chosen *annually*, shall be *paid* by the State, and shall be subject to *recall* even within the year; 3 so *cautiously* has our *constitution* guarded against an *abuse* of the trust reposed in our representatives in the federal government; whereas by the *third* and *sixth* sections of the *first* article of this new system, the senators are to be chosen for *six* years instead of being chosen *annually*; instead of being paid by *their States* who send them, *they* in conjunction with the other branch, are to *pay themselves* out of the treasury of the United States; and are not liable to be *recalled* during the period for which they are chosen—Thus, Sir, for *six* years the *senators* are rendered totally and absolutely *independent of their States*, of whom they ought to be the *representatives*, without any *bond* or *tie* between them—During *that time* they may join in measures *ruinous* and *destructive* to *their States*, even such as should *totally annihilate* their State *governments*, and their States *cannot recall* them, *nor exercise any controul over them*. Another consideration, Mr. Speaker, it was thought ought to have *great weight* to prove that the *smaller States* cannot *depend on the senate* for the *preservation of their rights*, either against *large* and *ambitious States*, or against an *ambitious, aspiring President*.—The senate, Sir, is so constituted, that they are not only to compose one branch of the legislature, but by the second section of the second article, they are to *compose a privy council for the President*; hence it will he necessary, that they should be, in a great measure, a *permanent* body, *constantly residing* at the seat of government. *Seventy* years is estimated for the life of a man; it can hardly be supposed, that a senator,
especially from the States remote from the seat of empire, will accept of an appointment which must estrange him for six years from his State, without giving up to a great degree his prospects in his own State. If he has a family, he will take his family with him to the place where the government shall be fixed, that will become his home, and there is every reason to expect that his future views and prospects will centre in the favours and emoluments either of the general government, or of the government of that State where the seat of empire is established: In either case, he is lost to his own State. If he places his future prospects in the favours and emoluments of the general government, he will become the dependant and creature of the President, as the system enables a senator to be appointed to offices, and without the nomination of the President, no appointment can take place; as such, he will favour the wishes of the President, and concur in his measures, who, if he has no ambitious views of his own to gratify, may be too favourable to the ambitious views of the large States, who will have an undue share in his original appointment, and on whom he will be more dependant afterwards than on the States which are smaller. If the senator places his future prospects in that State where the seat of empire is fixed; from that time he will be in every question wherein its particular interest may be concerned the representative of that State, not of his own.

But even this provision apparently for the security of the State governments, inadequate as it is, is entirely left at the mercy of the general government, for by the fourth section of the first article, it is expressly provided, that the Congress shall have a power to make and alter all regulations concerning the time and manner of holding elections for senators; a provision, expressly looking forward to, and I have no doubt designed for the utter extinction and abolition of all State governments; nor will this, I believe, be doubted by any person, when I inform you that some of the warm advocates and patrons of the system in convention, strenuously opposed the choice of the senators by the State legislatures, insisting that the State governments ought not to be introduced in any manner so as to be component parts of, or instruments for carrying into execution, the general government—Nay, so far were the friends of the system from pretending that they meant it or considered it as a federal system, that on the question being proposed, “that a union of the States, merely federal, ought to be the sole object of the exercise of the powers vested in the convention:” it was negatived by a majority of the members, and it was resolved, “that a national government ought to be formed”—afterwards the word “national” was struck out by them, because they thought the word might tend to alarm—and although now, they who advocate the system, pretend to call themselves federalists, in convention the distinction was just the reverse; those who opposed the system, were there considered and stiled the federal party, those who advocated it, the antifederal...