This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestibly that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter: I mean, so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive. For I agree that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such an union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence, as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution; and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.

The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.

Some perplexity respecting the right of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they forbid.

If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not
to be collected from any particular provisions in the constitution. It is not otherwise to be
supposed that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in
fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be prefered; or in other words,
the constitution ought to be prefered to the statute, the intention of the people to the
intention of their agents.

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the
will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the
former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those
which are not fundamental.

This exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory laws, is
exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes
existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them
containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the courts to
liquidate and fix their meaning and operation: So far as they can by any fair construction be
reconciled to each other; reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done: Where
this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the
other. The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is that
the last in order of time shall be prefered to the first. But this is mere rule of construction, not
derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not
enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to
truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it
reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an equal authority, that which was the last
indication of its will, should have the preference.

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and
derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as
proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be prefered to the
subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that, accordingly, whenever a
particular statute contravenes the constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to
adhere to the latter, and disregard the former.

It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute
their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen
in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.

If then the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.

This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed constitution will never concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing constitution, would on that account be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the people have by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.

But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our
governments, than but few may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of
the judiciary have already been felt in more states than one; and though they may have
displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have
commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men of
every description ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts;
as no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which
he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now feel that the inevitable tendency of such a
spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead,
universal distrust and distress.

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