An American
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. . . The first thought which naturally arises upon the subject, is, that the system, (considering the characters who formed it) must contain many of the essentials for a good Constitution; and also, that great difficulty will attend any proposed alterations. The States which adopt it in its present form, will naturally start with apprehensions at any proposition from a non-concurring State. "She wants to gain greater advantages, to the injury of her sister States," will be the language of jealousy. "No," they may continue, "let us try this government a few years, and then we shall be better able to reason upon its perfections, and its imperfections, and by a convention enlightened by experience of its effects, perfect it."

Should an attempt now be made to alter it, it must be by a new convention, and the non-concurring States, would naturally send Members to the new convention who were warm for making the wished for alterations; and is it probable the other States would agree to such alterations? Is it not much more probable, they would disagree? If the States, which rejected the constitution, made propositions for alterations, may we not conclude that the States which adopted it, would also make new propositions? Amidst the various and opposite propositions, can we suppose an union would take place? If there should be such mutual concessions in the new convention, (which is not to be expected, when appointed under such circumstances) it will require "trope against trope," to suppose all the States would severally adopt their system? After long deliberation, it appears to me, that the only way for the people of America ever to obtain a free national government, is to adopt the system as it now stands; and by a constant exertion to elect good men for Representatives in Congress, and a watchful attention to their proceedings, we shall have as free and good a government as any nation under heaven.

The idea of a convention of the States, in some future time, to review the system, and to make such emendations as time and experience, and the wisdom of the world may point out, will powerfully tend at once to preserve good order, and to keep the people attentive to their rights, and to the good administration of government. The checks to all deviations from right government, in Congress, will be almost innumerable. The State Legislatures, will ever be a jealous and powerful check; the executive, and the judiciary powers, of each State, will also form another powerful check; add to these constitutional checks, the people in every State will keep a fixed eye upon all the acts of Congress; and the great number of enterprising men who will

ever be pushing their influence to obtain a seat in Congress, will be eagle-eyed to discover the errours of government, in order to acquire popular fame, whereby to accomplish their design. All those circumstances, with a great number of others that might be mentioned, will forever form a guardian to the liberties of America, and a powerful stimulous to Congress steadily to pursue the best interests of our country.

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