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Fabius II

Pennsylvania Mercury, 15 April 1788 (excerpt)

. . . This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the necessary information, for directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE BODY WHATEVER, for fear of undue influence.

He is to be chosen in the following manner. Each state shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of *electors*, equal to *the whole number of senators and representatives*, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress: but no *senator or representative*, or *person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States*, shall be appointed an elector. As these electors are to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, of course they will be appointed by the people of the state, if *such be the pleasure of the people*. Thus, the fairest, freest opening is given, for each state to chuse such *electors* for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust.

To guard against undue influence these electors, thus chosen, are to meet *in their respective states*, and vote *by ballot*; and still further to guard against it, Congress may determine the *time of chusing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes*—WHICH DAY SHALL BE THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. All the votes from the several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein counted. The president is to hold his office for *four* years.

When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from *partiality*. The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interests of their country. . . .

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