
A year after the shots were fired at Lexington and Concord, heralding the beginning of the American Revolutionary War, French Foreign Minister Vergennes submitted a report to King Louis XVI and his council on the escalating conflict between England and its North American colonies. Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes (1719–1787), had been a career diplomat who served as France’s foreign minister from 1774 until his death in 1787. In blunt, matter-of-fact realpolitik, Vergennes outlined “the possible and probable” impact of the rebellion on France and Spain. According to Vergennes, it was uncertain whether France and Spain should favor “the subjection or the independence of the English Colonies.” In either case, France and Spain would be threatened “by dangers that it is perhaps not within the nature of human foresight to prevent or deter.”

Vergennes believed that “the continuation of the war” would be “infinitely advantageous” for both France and Spain because both victor and vanquished would be exhausted. But, on the other hand, France and Spain should be alerted to a number of fearful consequences that might affect them, including: (1) fearing the growing cost of the war, the English ministry might seek a peaceful conciliation; (2) after conquering its colonies, the British ministry might subjugate the British homeland; (3) having difficulty defeating its colonies, the British might seek compensation by conquering French and Spanish islands in the West Indies thus ameliorating some of their shame and offering conciliation to the American “Insurgents” by opening up their trade with and provisioning these islands; and (4) the independent American colonies might force their way into commerce with the French and Spanish islands thereby destroying the bonds that these islands had with “their Mother Country.” Furthermore, a British defeat in North America, would likely encourage the British ministry to capture some French and Spanish West Indies islands—all of which, except for Cuba, were vulnerable. These islands should not be considered safe from “unprovoked” British attacks because of guarantees in the treaty of 1763 or because of “public honor.” The British, believing that after the conclusion of the uprising, France and Spain would seize the opportunity of British weakness to attack, would feel justified in launching a peremptory attack on the French and Spanish islands.
To remain in power, the British ministry would likely come to some accommodation with their colonies and use their country’s vast mobilized war power to provoke a popular war with France or invade Mexico—both immoral measures but ones that could assist Britain in extinguishing its national debt.
If France and Spain were to give in to their national interests and to “the justice of their cause” (which is the interest of “humanity so often offended by England”), instead of following their monarchs’ love of tranquility, and if France and Spain were financially and militarily prepared for war, it would appear that God “has marked this moment for the humiliation of England.” This, Vergennes believed, would be the opportune time to avenge themselves against British evils, “which she has done since the beginning of the Century against those who have had the misfortune to be her neighbors or her rivals.”
Vergennes felt that France and Spain should render whatever vigorous aid the American colonies might need in their next campaign. Prolonging the animosity and exhaustion of the British and their colonies “would then determine the moment for France and Spain “to strike the decisive blows which will return England to the order of secondary Powers, would take away from her the Dominion that she claims to exercise in the four parts of the world with as much pride as injustice, and would deliver the Universe from a greedy Tyrant who wants to devour all the power and all the riches at one time.”
If the French and Spanish monarchs decided to take a delayed action against England, they should determine “what conduct is the most suitable” to obtain their goals. First, they “should avoid compromising oneself and not provoke the evils one wants to ward off.” Secondly, they should not deceive themselves into thinking “that the most absolute and rigorous inaction would shield us from all suspicion. We know that our present conduct is not exempt. The English, accustomed to conducting themselves on the impulse of their interest and to judging others by themselves, will always think that we will not let escape such a fine occasion to destroy them; even if they did not think it, they would feign it if they had the need to attack us, and Europe would be persuaded of the Truth of their imputation despite our denials.” Thirdly, it was in the interest of France and Spain that the American war should continue for at least another year because the British army would be “weakened by its victories or by its defeats” and thus be unable to threaten any French or Spanish possessions. Furthermore, another year of warfare might possibly “change the aspect of affairs.” Finally, France and Spain should convince the British ministry that they “are pacific” so that they won’t fear of opening “a brisk and expensive Campaign” against their rebellious colonies. At the same time, the American colonists should be encouraged “by some secret favors and by vague hopes” to continue their struggle for independence without reaching “an accommodation” with the British. Such a prolonged conflict would only increase the colonists’ animosity toward the British, so that even if Britain were ultimately to stifle the movement for independence, the British “would long have need of all her forces to dampen the spirit of independence of the Americans, and she would not dare to expose herself to the combined efforts with a foreign enemy that they would make to recover their liberty.”
Should all of these consequences occur, Vergennes recommended that France and Spain should:
(1) continue to convince the English ministry of their peaceful intentions;
(2) that the insurgents should be given secret assistance in munitions, money, etc. The benefits for France and Spain would far outweigh the “small Sacrifice, and no reason of dignity or equity would oppose it”;
(3) that no formal pact with the insurgents should be entered into. Such a pact would be beneath the dignity of the King. Any arrangement with the colonies could “only be solidly based in mutual interest.” No treaty should be considered before the colonies achieved their independence.
(4) that if France and Spain should give aid, it should be repaid after the colonies achieved their independence;
(5) that too great a sense of apathy at the present time would be interpreted by others “as the effect of fear and of that immoderate love of peace which, for the past few years, has produced so many evils and injustices; and that England, judging that the incapacity of our means and the pusillanimity that She will attribute to us will be guarantors of each other, may become still more demanding than she already is, and that she may dare anything, either directly and in the open, or by the insolence of her searches and of her cruisers, and by insults in detail which She would not and cannot atone for, and which we cannot and would not swallow. The English respect only those who can make themselves feared”;
(6) of overriding importance was “the necessity of placing ourselves in a position which can either contain the English, or render their attacks uncertain, or ensure the means to punish them.” France and Spain should wisely pursue policies that “would augment the effective and active forces of the two Monarchies to the level of their real power.” Such policies should always be followed but at the present moment such “providential activity perhaps becomes indispensable” to “efficaciously prevent possible evils, and repair those that we will not be able to prevent.” Above all, Vergennes advised that France and Spain should remain at peace no matter what “the outcome of the war between England and her Colonies” might be.


Louis XVI ultimately adhered to his Foreign Minister’s advice. Soon, France started covertly supplying the Americans (predominantly with gunpowder) through Rodrigue Hortalez et Compagnie. Treaty negotiations were begun with Silas Deane of Connecticut. By 1777, the French government had supplied over five million livres in aid. Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee were added to the American negotiating team in that year and on 6 February 1778 two treaties were signed—a military alliance and a commercial treaty. Spain formally declared war on Great Britain on June 21, 1779, but never signed a formal treaty with the United States during the Revolutionary War. The alliance with France and the assistance (military and financial) provided by France and Spain were critical to securing American independence.